COMMENTARY: The financial sector remains one of the most targeted industries for ransomware attacks. The combination of high-value financial data, real-time payment systems, and the sector's role in the global economy makes it an attractive target for both financially motivated threat actors and state-sponsored groups. Over the past year, the threat landscape has evolved significantly, with attackers refining their tactics to maximize financial gain and operational disruption.
The increase in ransomware incidents targeting financial institutions reflects a broader shift in attacker behavior. Threat groups are moving beyond basic encryption-based extortion to more complex methods, including data exfiltration, supply chain compromise, and targeted disruption of trading and payment platforms. The rise of Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) models, the increasing use of zero-day vulnerabilities, and the growing involvement of state-sponsored actors have further complicated the threat environment.
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Here are five important trends shaping ransomware threats to the financial sector and five steps security teams can take to mitigate the risk and reduce the impact of future attacks:
- Double and triple extortion becomes the norm: Ransomware operators have shifted from simple data encryption to more aggressive forms of extortion. Double extortion—where attackers steal sensitive data in addition to encrypting it—has become a standard tactic. If the victim refuses to pay, attackers threaten to publish or sell the stolen data on dark web forums. Triple extortion introduces an additional layer of pressure. After encrypting and stealing data, attackers contact customers, partners, and even regulatory bodies to force payment. Financial institutions have reported cases where ransomware operators have threatened to contact high-net-worth clients directly, warning them that their personal financial data will be leaked unless the ransom gets paid. For example, a recent attack on a multinational investment bank involved double extortion, where attackers encrypted sensitive client data, and also contacted several large clients to pressure the bank into payment. The attackers threatened to release detailed transaction data and account information unless the bank met a $15 million ransom demand.
- Targeted attacks on payment and trading platforms: Ransomware groups are increasingly developing malware specifically designed to target financial infrastructure. High-frequency trading systems, payment gateways, and real-time clearing platforms have become prime targets because even short-term disruption can lead to significant financial and reputational damage. In one notable case, a ransomware group targeted a SWIFT-connected payment processor, encrypting transaction data and disrupting settlement operations for several hours. The attack caused significant market volatility and forced the institution to suspend trading activity while systems were restored. The technical sophistication involved in these attacks suggests that some may have been state-sponsored or linked to organized crime groups with deep financial sector knowledge. Financial institutions face additional risk because many core transaction systems rely on legacy infrastructure, which is more vulnerable to exploitation.
- Increased use of zero-day vulnerabilities: Ransomware operators are relying on zero-day vulnerabilities to gain initial access to financial networks. Rather than running traditional phishing or social engineering attacks, some ransomware groups are purchasing or developing zero-day exploits to target unpatched systems. A recent case involved the exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability in a widely-used file transfer application. Attackers used the vulnerability to gain access to financial institutions’ internal networks, exfiltrating sensitive data before deploying ransomware to encrypt critical systems. The attack affected several large banks and payment processors, with ransom demands exceeding $10 million-per-institution. Zero-day exploitation gives attackers an edge because it lets them bypass perimeter defenses and endpoint protection tools. Financial institutions are particularly vulnerable because patching cycles for critical systems are often delayed due to operational and compliance requirements.
- Ransomware as a cover for destructive attacks: Some ransomware campaigns targeting the financial sector appear to have geopolitical motivations rather than purely financial ones. In these cases, ransomware serves as a cover for destructive attacks aimed at undermining financial stability. A destructive attack in early 2024 involved a wiper disguised as ransomware. Attackers encrypted systems at a major European financial institution, but provided no decryption key or ransom demand. Further analysis showed that the malware was designed to corrupt data and make recovery impossible. The attack was linked to a state-sponsored threat actor known for targeting critical infrastructure. The use of ransomware as a political weapon reflects the increasing overlap between financial sector threats and broader cyber warfare strategies. Financial institutions face unique challenges because they sit at the intersection of national security and economic stability, making them high-value targets for both criminal and state-sponsored groups.
- The growth of Ransomware-as-a-Service: The rise of Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) has lowered the barrier-to-entry for ransomware operators, increasing the volume and sophistication of attacks on financial institutions. RaaS models let even inexperienced threat actors launch ransomware campaigns using pre-built malware and infrastructure provided by more experienced operators. Under the RaaS model, the developers of ransomware strains lease their malware to affiliates in exchange for a percentage of ransom payments. This model has led to rapid proliferation of ransomware activity, with some threat actors launching coordinated attacks on multiple financial institutions simultaneously. One of the most active RaaS operators recently resumed operations after a brief disruption by law enforcement. Within weeks, the group launched a series of attacks on financial institutions, targeting both internal networks and third-party service providers. The group’s ability to recover quickly and continue operations highlights the resilience of the RaaS ecosystem.
Five mitigation steps for security teams
Here are five ways security teams in the financial sector can mitigate these growing threats:
- Implement a zero-trust model.
A zero-trust model ensures that access to systems and data gets granted only after continuous verification, minimizing the impact of initial access breaches. Here’s what to do:
- Require multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all systems and applications.
- Enforce the principle of least privilege by granting access only to the minimum resources needed.
- Implement network segmentation to contain potential lateral movement.
- Continuously monitor user behavior for anomalies using AI-driven behavioral analytics.
· Enhance endpoint detection and response.
EDR tools play a critical role in detecting and isolating ransomware activity before it spreads. Take these steps:
- Deploy EDR tools capable of identifying and quarantining ransomware behavior in real-time.
- Integrate threat intelligence feeds to update EDR rules based on the latest attack patterns.
- Automate response protocols to isolate affected systems and prevent further damage.
- Strengthen data backup and recovery protocols.
Robust backup and recovery protocols reduce the leverage that ransomware operators hold over victims. Here’s what to do:
- Maintain offline, immutable backups of critical data.
- Test recovery procedures regularly to ensure operational readiness.
- Encrypt backups and implement versioning to prevent corruption or tampering.
- Patch vulnerabilities and strengthen third-party security.
Addressing vulnerabilities before they are exploited reduces the attack surface for ransomware operators. Take these steps:
- Prioritize patching of internet-facing systems and applications.
- Conduct regular penetration tests to identify and remediate weaknesses.
- Limit third-party access through strict access controls and contractual security requirements.
· Develop a comprehensive incident response plan.
An effective incident response (IR) plan reduces recovery time and limits the operational impact of ransomware attacks. For a solid IR plan:
- Develop detailed playbooks for responding to ransomware, including double extortion and destructive attacks.
- Establish communication protocols for engaging regulators, law enforcement, and affected customers.
- Conduct regular red team exercises to test the effectiveness of response procedures.
Ransomware attacks against the financial sector have become more targeted and sophisticated, driven by the rise of double extortion, zero-day exploitation, and state-sponsored operations. Financial institutions must adapt by doing the following: adopt a zero-trust architecture, enhance EDR capabilities, and strengthen incident response planning.
The financial sector’s strategic importance makes it a high-value target for both criminal and state-backed actors. The rise of RaaS models and the increasing availability of zero-day exploits will likely drive further escalation in ransomware activity. By proactively addressing these threats, financial institutions can reduce the risk of operational disruption, financial loss, and reputational damage.
Callie Guenther, senior manager, cyber threat research, Critical Start
SC Media Perspectives columns are written by a trusted community of SC Media cybersecurity subject matter experts. Each contribution has a goal of bringing a unique voice to important cybersecurity topics. Content strives to be of the highest quality, objective and non-commercial.
